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Abstract
The recent judgment in Casamitjana Costa v The League Against Cruel Sports in 
England and Wales held that ethical veganism was a protected philosophical belief 
under employment law. In contrast, vegetarianism was found not to be a protected 
philosophical belief in Conisbee v Crossley Farms Limited and others. The authors 
argue that the Employment Tribunal misunderstood the notion of vegetarianism 
when deciding that it was a ‘life-style choice’. There are different kinds of vegans 
and vegetarians, each with their own way of practising the philosophy which influ-
ences how they live their life. Not all people who follow a meat-free diet should be 
afforded this protection, and it depends on whether their belief is one which is deter-
mined by certain factors, such as animal welfare and environmentalism, rather than 
for health purposes. The authors explore the arguments and analysis in the above 
employment cases, coming to the conclusion that the tribunals oversimplified what 
it means to hold values such as veganism and vegetarianism, failing to understand 
the differences between different classifications and sub-groups when coming to 
a decision. The different kinds of vegans and vegetarians and their characteristics 
are outlined, before determining whether this should constitute protection under 
employment law, protecting individuals from discrimination. The situation in the 
USA and Canada regarding this issue is very different, and there are parallels drawn 
with attempting to establish veganism or vegetarianism as a religion, and where they 
could benefit from the recent decision in England and Wales. Finally, this paper 
concludes that ethical and environmental veganism and vegetarianism should both 
qualify as protected philosophical beliefs, but other kinds may fall short of what is 
required to satisfy the requirements under law.
Keywords Veganism and vegetarianism · Protected philosophical beliefs · 
Employment · Animal welfare
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Introduction
Veganism is by no means a new concept, but has become more prominent in recent 
years, particularly in the UK. Statistics show that in 2018 the UK had the highest 
number of new vegan products launched,1 which is understandable when the num-
ber of vegans has risen to 600,000 in 2019, from 150,000 in 2014, with about half of 
UK vegans converting in 2018.2 Other research found that vegetarianism is the most 
popular non-meat diet, followed by pescatarian and then vegan, with an estimation 
that 6.7 million British adults currently follow a meat-free diet, but with an indica-
tion that this will rise to 12 million by the end of 2020.3 The reasons for becoming 
vegetarian or vegan4 vary, including to improve health, the environmental impacts 
and, the main motivation, animal welfare concerns.
Despite the rising popularity of veganism and vegetarianism, those who practice 
as vegans or vegetarians can be subjected to discrimination. There are reasons as to 
why individuals are opposed to the vegan diet, and actively argue against it, with 
views that ‘predation is natural and that animals often kill and eat each other.’5 Oth-
ers see it as an attack on their autonomy of choice or a conflict with the omnivore’s 
majority beliefs.6 Some of the difficulties vegans report in their life is eating out, 
finding vegan substitutes for clothing and household products, and feeling isolated 
from omnivore family and friends.7 Further, vegans and vegetarians face stereotypes 
and prejudices on a regular basis, such as the belief they want to convert omni-
vores to veganism and are judgmental toward them, that they are hippies and all 
are animal activists.8 Some even hide their beliefs in the workplace, for the fear of 
prejudice, or avoid conversations about their beliefs at mealtimes, wanting to avoid 
confrontation.9
1 Mintel Press Office, #Veganuary: UK Overtakes Germany as World’s Leader for Vegan Food 
Launches, (January 10th 2019) https ://www.minte l.com/press -centr e/food-and-drink /vegan uary-uk-overt 
akes-germa ny-as-world s-leade r-for-vegan -food-launc hes.
2 Vegan Trade Journal, Almost Half of UK Vegans Made the Change in the Last Year, According to New 
Data (19th November 2018) https ://www.vegan trade journ al.com/almos t-half-of-uk-vegan s-made-the-
chang e-in-the-last-year-accor ding-to-new-data/.
3 Finder, UK Diet Trends 2020 (27 April 2020) https ://www.finde r.com/uk/uk-diet-trend s.
4 Agricultural and Horticulture Development Board, Consumer Insights, (July 2018) https ://media .ahdb.
org.uk/media /Defau lt/Consu mer%20and %20Ret ail%20Ins ight%20Ima ges/PDF%20art icles /Consu merIn 
sight s%20WEB _1653_18072 5.pdf.
5 Matthew Calarco, Being toward meat: anthropocentrism, indistinction, and veganism, 38 Dialect 
Anthropol 415, 426 (2014).
6 Cara C. MacInnis and Gordon Hodson, It ain’t easy eating greens: Evidence of bias toward vegetarians 
and vegans from both source and target, 20(6) Group Processes and Intergroup Relations 721 (2017).
7 Kelsey Steele, The Vegan Journey: An Exploration of Vegan Experiences with Vegan from Burlington, 
Vermont, Environmental Studies Electronic Thesis Collection 23, University of Vermont (2013).
8 Kelsey Steele, The Vegan Journey: An Exploration of Vegan Experiences with Vegan from Burlington, 
Vermont, Environmental Studies Electronic Thesis Collection 23, University of Vermont (2013); Anna 
Lindquist, Beyond Hippies and Rabbit Food: The Social Effects of Vegetarianism and Veganism Honors 
Program Theses, University of Puget Sound (2013).
9 Anna Lindquist, Beyond Hippies and Rabbit Food: The Social Effects of Vegetarianism and Vegan-
ism Honors Program Theses, University of Puget Sound (2013); Lisa Johnson, The Religion of Ethical 
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Though vegetarians and vegans may have such a strong belief, they are not more 
biased than meat eaters, but as Adams argues, they ‘do not benefit as meat eaters 
from having their biases actually approved of by the dominant culture’.10 Further, it 
has been trivialised, or seen as a ‘distraction’ from other important aspects of his-
tory, and judged as irrelevant to other topics such as sexism and racism.11 This dis-
crimination, or bias, does happen though, and studies have found that vegans and 
vegetarians are subjected to attitudes which are equivalent or more negative than 
common prejudice target groups, including significantly more negatively than black 
people, and overall vegans were viewed more negatively than vegetarians.12 This 
was not, however, in all aspects of life, and they were not subject to less willing-
ness to be hired for a job or rented accommodation compared to other target groups, 
including immigrants and atheists.13 This kind of bias even has a name: vegan-
phobia. This bias and discrimination can affect individuals in the work place, for 
example being forced to use animal products in the workplace,14 or their taxes going 
toward systems which abuse animals, ‘forcing vegans to contribute to something 
they strongly disagree with.’15
In January 2020, an Employment Tribunal in England held ethical veganism to be 
a philosophical belief and therefore a protected characteristic pursuant to the Equal-
ity Act 2010.16 As such, ethical vegans may gain protection from discriminatory 
treatment. In contrast however, an Employment Tribunal previously held that veg-
etarianism was not capable of satisfying the requirements of being a philosophical 
belief.17 The authors will argue that these cases oversimplified concepts of vegan-
ism and vegetarianism. In particular, the authors will analyse what it means to hold 
beliefs in veganism and vegetarianism, and how the tribunal failed to understand 
the differences between different classifications and sub-groups when coming to a 
decision.
This article begins by defining religion, philosophical beliefs and creeds, look-
ing at the legal position in the England and Wales, US and Canada. A discussion of 
the philosophy of veganism and vegetarianism follows, looking at the work of Fran-
cione specifically, before exploring the influencing factors of becoming, and kinds 
of, a vegan or vegetarian. It is analysed whether veganism and vegetarianism are 
10 Carol J. Adams, The Sexual Politics of Meat: A Feminist-Vegetarian Critical Theory, xxxvii (Blooms-
bury Academic 2015).
11 Id. 142.
12 Cara C. MacInnis and Gordon Hodson, ‘It ain’t easy eating greens: Evidence of bias toward vegetar-
ians and vegans from both source and target’ 20(6) Group Processes and Intergroup Relations 721, 726 
(2017).
13 Id. 726–727.
14 Donna D. Page, Veganism and Sincerely Held Religious Beliefs in the Workplace: No Protection 
without Definition, 7 U. Pa. J. Lab. & Emp. L. 363 (2005).
15 Oscar Horta, ‘Discrimination Against Vegans’ 24 Re Publica 359, 370 (2018).
16 Casamitjana Costa v The League Against Cruel Sports [2020] ET 3331129/2018 (England and 
Wales).
17 Conisbee v Crossley Farms Limited and others [2019] ET 3335357/2018 (England and Wales).
Veganism, 5(1) Journal of Animal Ethics 31 (2015); Swinder Janda and Phillip J. Trocchia, Vegetarian-
ism: Toward a Greater Understanding, 18(12) Psychology and Marketing 1205 (2001).
Footnote 9 (continued)
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protected philosophical beliefs, exploring recent case law in the England and Wales, 
and whether they should be protected. Finally, this article concludes which classifi-
cations of veganism and vegetarianism should both qualify as protected philosophi-
cal beliefs, though, some classifications may fall short of what is required to satisfy 
the requirements under law.
Defining Religion, Philosophical Beliefs and Creeds
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this 
right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either 
alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his 
religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.18{emphasis 
added}
The text above acknowledges the universal human right to thought, conscience and 
beliefs. This right is further enshrined into international law through Article 18 of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966. The movement to 
eradicate discrimination on the grounds of religion and belief is further re-enforced 
through the UN Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of 
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief. Whilst Article 1(1) of the aforemen-
tioned Declaration re-iterates the language of ‘thought, conscience and religion’, 
Article 1(2) states, ‘No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his free-
dom to have a religion or belief of his choice.’{emphasis added}
Article 9 of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) also enshrines 
the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, whilst within the European 
Union, Article 10 the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union embeds 
freedom of ‘thought, conscience and religion’ within member states.19 Whilst there 
have been no cases determining the meaning of thought, conscience and religion 
within the context of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, the 
matter has been considered in relation to the ECHR.
Religion is not defined within the text of Article 9 nor in the European Court 
of Human Rights case law.20 This is deliberate, as any definition would need to be 
‘both flexible enough to embrace the whole range of religions worldwide…and spe-
cific enough to be applicable to individual cases—an extremely difficult, indeed 
impossible undertaking.’21 However, Article 9 ECHR has been held to apply to ‘the 
“major” or “ancient” world religions’, ‘new or relatively new religions’ and ‘various 
coherent and sincerely-held philosophical convictions’.22
21 Id.
22 Id. para 17.
18 United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights art.18.
19 The Treaty on European Union art. 6 (as amended by Treaty of Lisbon).
20 European Court of Human Rights, Guidance on Article 9 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights: Freedom of thought, conscience and religion para. 14 (30 April 2020)
 https ://www.echr.coe.int/Docum ents/Guide _Art_9_ENG.pdf.
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Freedom of belief, including secular beliefs, is well established in international 
law, as summarised above. However, whilst international law recognises the free-
dom of religion and belief, the protection of these freedoms needs to be afforded 
at domestic level for individuals to meaningfully avail themselves to protection of 
these freedoms as the discrimination will often emanate from individuals or private 
companies rather than the State. Further, where freedom of religion and belief are 
protected at domestic level, it is for national authorities to interpret the extent of the 
protection afforded based upon their jurisdictional definition of religion and belief, 
or whatever wording each jurisdiction may utilise. The difficulties on establishing 
an international consensus on the definition of religion and belief can be seen with 
certain ‘religions’ such as the Church of Scientology.23
Within England and Wales, religion and belief are a protected characteristic pur-
suant to the Equality Act 2010.24 Whilst claims for contravention of the ECHR can 
only be brought against public authorities,25 courts and tribunals must interpret leg-
islation, so far as is possible, in a way which is compatible with the ECHR.26 As 
such, the definition of religion and belief is a ‘broad definition in line with the free-
dom of thought, conscience and religion guaranteed by Article 9’.27
Religion is defined under the Equality Act 2010 as ‘any religion and a reference 
to religion includes a reference to a lack of religion.’28 Thus, religion is defined as 
itself. The definition encompasses traditional religions such as Buddhism, Christian-
ity, Hinduism, Islam and Judaism but also smaller religions such as Rastafarianism 
or Paganism, as long as it has a clear structure and belief system.29 The approach 
appears to be that whilst religion is not defined in England and Wales, the courts and 
tribunals will know it when they see it.
Section 10(2) of the Equality Act 2010 defines ‘belief’ as ‘any religious or philo-
sophical belief and a reference to belief includes a reference to a lack of belief.’30 In 
determining what constitutes a ‘philosophical belief’, the Explanatory Notes to the 
Equality Act 2010 provide some guidance stating the belief ‘must be genuinely held; 
be a belief and not an opinion or viewpoint based on the present state of information 
available; be a belief as to a weighty and substantial aspect of human life and behav-
iour; attain a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance; and 
23 Id. paras 21–22.
24 The Equality Act 2010 consolidated discrimination and equality legislation that had developed over a 
period of more than 40 years. Prior to the Equality Act 2010, religion and belief was protected under The 
Employment Equality (Religion and Belief) Regulations 2003. The Employment Equality (Religion and 
Belief) Regulations 2003 were introduced pursuant to the United Kingdom’s obligations under Council 
Directive (EC) 2000/78.
25 Human Rights Act 1998 section 7.
26 Id, section 3.
27 Equality Act 2010, Explanatory Notes, para.51; see also Harron v Chief Constable of Dorset Police 
[2016] IRLR 481 (England and Wales).
28 Equality Act 2010, section 10(1).
29 Equality and Human Rights Commission, Religion or belief discrimination: Advice and Guidance 
https ://www.equal ityhu manri ghts.com/en/advic e-and-guida nce/relig ion-or-belie f-discr imina tion; see also 
Equality Act 2010, Explanatory Notes, para.51.
30 Equality Act 2010, Explanatory Notes, para.52.
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be worthy of respect in a democratic society, compatible with human dignity and 
not conflict with the fundamental rights of others.’31 Further, the belief must have a 
similar status or cogency to a religious belief.32
There is an inherent problem in providing a statutory definition for philosophi-
cal beliefs due to the widely varying beliefs that individuals may hold and which of 
these beliefs should be protected. As with religion, it has therefore been left to the 
courts to define whether a particular belief should be protected and indeed the guid-
ance set out above was implied or introduced by reference to the jurisprudence.33
In the United States, freedom of religion is established by the First Amendment 
of the Constitution stating that ‘Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof…’34 Whilst the First 
Amendment regulates the role of the Government in legislating on religion, it does 
little to protect individuals from being discriminated against by other individuals 
or private organisations. At Federal level, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
(Title VII) prohibits employment discrimination on the grounds of, inter alia, reli-
gion.35 In contrast to the Equality Act 2010, Title VII only refers to ‘religion’, not 
‘religion and belief’. It is therefore necessary to consider the definition of religion 
for the purposes of Title VII. Religion is defined broadly to include ‘all aspects of 
religious observance and practice, as well as belief…’36 Whilst it includes all tra-
ditional religions, it also encompasses unorganised and less common systems 
of belief.37 The US Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) have 
adopted the definition of religion given by the US Supreme Court in United States 
v Seeger and therefore, it is religious if it is “a sincere and meaningful belief that 
occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by…God.”38 As 
such, religious beliefs include theistic and non-theistic beliefs, although beliefs are 
not protected merely because they are strongly held.39 In United States v Meyers,40 
the court set out the following factors to assist in determining whether a belief is 
31 Id.
32 Grainger plc and others v Nicholson [2010] I.C.R. 360, 370 (England and Wales); Regulation 2 of 
The Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003 defined ‘religion or belief’ as ‘any reli-
gion, religious belief, or similar philosophical belief.’ {emphasis added} As such, under the Regulations, 
a ‘philosophical belief’ would need to have some similarity to the definition of religion or religious belief 
to gain protection under the Regulations. The Regulations were amended by section 77(1) of the Equal-
ity Act 2006 to remove the word ‘similar’. As explained by Baroness Scotland, it is not clear whether 
the word ‘similar’ adds to the definition describing it as ‘redundant’ as ‘any philosophical belief must 
attain a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance, must be worthy of respect in a 
democratic society and must not be incompatible with human dignity.’ (HL Deb 13 July 2005, vol 673, 
col 1109–1110).
33 See Grainger plc and others v Nicholson [2010] I.C.R. 360, 369–370 (England and Wales).
34 U.S. Const. amend 1. art 1.
35 42. U.S.C. §2000e-2.
36 42. U.S.C. §2000e-2(j).




40 906 F. Supp. 1494 (D. Wyo. 1995).
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religious: Ultimate Ideas; Metaphysical Beliefs; Moral or Ethical System; Compre-
hensiveness of Beliefs; and Accoutrements of Religion.41 The latter factor considers 
the following: Founder, Prophet, or Teacher; Important Writings; Gathering Places; 
Keepers of Knowledge; Ceremonies and Rituals; Structure or Organization; Holi-
days; Diet or Fasting; Appearance and Clothing; and Propagation.42
The court recognised that no one factor is dispositive, and instead the factors 
should be seen as ‘criteria’ that if ‘minimally satisfied’ should include the beliefs 
with the term religion.43 However, ‘[p]urely personal, political, ideological, or secu-
lar beliefs probably would not satisfy enough criteria for inclusion.’44 Examples of 
beliefs falling outside the definition of religion include: nihilism; anarchism; paci-
fism; utopianism; socialism; libertarianism; Marxism; ‘vegetism’; and humanism.45 
Such an effect this has had on gaining protection for veganism and vegetarianism in 
the US, some have argued for the establishment of a Church of Animal Liberation, 
to provide a religious organization for those who wish to seek protection and accom-
modation for their beliefs in animal rights.46
In contrast to the United States Constitution, the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms (the Canadian Charter) enshrines ‘conscience and religion’ as well as 
‘thought, belief, opinion and expression’ as fundamental freedoms.47 Moon posits 
that ‘distinguishing religious beliefs/practices from secular beliefs/practices’ in Can-
ada resolves the problem ‘which has bedevilled the American courts’.48 However, 
the Canadian Charter only applies to Governments, not disputes between individu-
als, businesses and other organisations.
The Canadian Human Rights Act does prohibit discrimination on the grounds of 
religion.49 Whilst the Act only applies to federally regulated activities, each province 
and territory has its own anti-discrimination laws, adopting differing approaches to 
religion and creed.50 The Supreme Court of Canada has defined religion broadly 
‘as a particular and comprehensive system of faith and worship’ which ‘tends to 






46 Bruce Friedrich, The Church of Animal Liberation: Animal Rights as Religion under the Free Exer-
cise Clause, 21 Animal L. 65 (2014).
47 Constitution Act, 1982, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, section 2.
48 Richard Moon, Religious Commitment and Identity: Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem, 29(1) The 
Supreme Court Law Review: Osgoode’s Annual Constitutional Cases Conference 201, 214 (2005).
49 R.S.C., 1985, c. H-6, section 3(1).
50 A useful summary is provided in Ontario Human Rights Commission, Human rights and creed 
research and consultation report, 48 (2013)
 http://a.ohrc.on.ca/sites /defau lt/files /consu ltati on%20rep ort_creed %20hum an%20rig hts%20res earch 
%20and %20con sulta tion%20rep ort.pdf.
51 Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem [2004] 2 SCR 551 para.39 (Canada).
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definition did not include ‘secular, socially based or conscientiously held’ beliefs.52 
The Supreme Court of Canada summarised the definition stating:
…religion is about freely and deeply held personal convictions or beliefs con-
nected to an individual’s spiritual faith and integrally linked to one’s self-defi-
nition and spiritual fulfilment, the practices of which allow individuals to fos-
ter a connection with the divine or with the subject or object of that spiritual 
faith.53
In 2015, the Ontario Human Rights Commission updated their ‘Policy on prevent-
ing discrimination based on creed’. Whilst creed was previously interpreted to mean 
religion,54 in the updated policy, creed was defined to ‘also include non-religious 
belief systems that, like religion, substantially influence a person’s identity, world-
view and way of life.’55 Whilst there is no single definition, the factors identifying 
a creed within this policy are; it is sincerely, freely and deeply held; it is integrally 
linked to a person’s identity, self-definition and fulfilment; it is a particular and com-
prehensive, overarching system of belief that governs one’s conduct and practices; 
it addresses ultimate questions of human existence, including ideas about life, pur-
pose, death, and the existence or non-existence of a Creator and/or a higher or differ-
ent order of existence; and it has some “nexus” or connection to an organization or 
community that professes a shared system of belief.56
In considering the various definitions used, it is clear that religion, philosophi-
cal beliefs and creed have been interpreted broadly. However, the various jurisdic-
tions have been reluctant to include secular beliefs, which would include vegan-
ism and vegetarianism, within the definition of religion. Whilst the position is still 
unclear with regards to the United States, which will be considered below, a secular 
belief system is more likely to be protected when legislation expressly differentiates 
between religion and other beliefs. This can be seen in international law, specifically 
within the context of the ECHR, within England and Wales protecting philosophical 
beliefs, and in Ontario, Canada developing the definition of creed as distinct from 
religion.
There is also a distinct similarity between the factors determining whether a 
belief constitutes a philosophical belief in England and Wales, or a creed in Ontario, 
Canada as shown in Table  1 below.57 This suggests that philosophical belief and 
creed are synonymous with one another. 
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Ontario Human Rights Commission, Human rights and creed research and consultation report, 46 
(2013) http://a.ohrc.on.ca/sites /defau lt/files /consu ltati on%20rep ort_creed %20hum an%20rig hts%20res 
earch %20and %20con sulta tion%20rep ort.pdf.
55 Ontario Human Rights Commission, Policy on preventing discrimination based on creed, (17 Septem-
ber 2015) http://www.ohrc.on.ca/en/polic y-preve nting -discr imina tion-based -creed .
56 Id.
57 The Ontario Human Rights Commission did not incorporate a factor similar to being ‘worthy of 
respect in a democratic society, compatible with human dignity and not conflict with the fundamental 
rights of others’, whilst it is not necessary for a philosophical belief to have ‘some “nexus” or connection 
to an organization or community that professes a shared system of belief’.
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Protection Afforded to Philosophical Beliefs and Creeds
The extent of protection afforded by anti-discrimination legislation varies between 
jurisdictions. In England and Wales, the Equality Act 2010 makes it unlawful to dis-
criminate against an individual on the grounds of a protected characteristic. The Act 
applies to numerous areas such as the provision of services,58 housing,59 employ-
ment,60 education,61 and associations.62 As such, individuals are protected from dis-
crimination in many aspects of their lives. There is a wide breadth of this protection 
in comparison to anti-discrimination legislation in other jurisdictions. For example, 
Title VII only relates to the employment field, and therefore does not offer protection 
from discrimination in other areas such as the provision of services. Further, it only 
applies where an employer employs fifteen or more employees.63 As such, there are 
significant limitations in the protection afforded under Title VII. However, there are 
various statutes in each State protecting freedom of religion. The Canadian Human 
Rights Act applies in the areas of the provision of goods and services,64 commercial 
and residential premises65 and employment.66 The Canadian Human Right Act is 
limited to Federally regulated activities although each Province has their own anti-
discrimination legislation.
The Equality Act 2010 protects individuals from different types of discrimina-
tion, namely: direct; indirect; harassment; and victimisation. Whilst there will be 
instances of individuals experiencing direct discrimination67 i.e. not being employed 
because of their vegan beliefs; in many instances, it is likely that an employer or 
service provider simply does not cater for their requirements. For example, a failure 
to provide a vegan meal option or the requirement to wear a uniform manufactured 
with non-vegan products. The issue is not that the individual is vegan per se, it is 
the manifestation of those vegan beliefs, i.e. their dietary requirements or refusal to 
wear clothes manufactured from animal products, which places the individual at a 
disadvantage in comparison to non-vegans.
Under Article 9 ECHR,68 the freedom of religion and belief is an absolute right. 
However, the right to manifest those beliefs may be limited where it is ‘prescribed 
by law and…necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for 
58 Equality Act 2010 Part 3.
59 Id. Part 4.
60 Id. Part 5.
61 Id. Part 6.
62 Id. Part 7.




67 Section 13(1) of the Equality Act 2010 defines direct discrimination as ‘A person (A) discriminates 
against another (B) if, because of a protected characteristic, A treats B less favourably than A treats or 
would treat others.’
68 European Court of Human Rights, Guidance on Article 9 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights: Freedom of thought, conscience and religion para. 25 (30 April 2020)
 https ://www.echr.coe.int/Docum ents/Guide _Art_9_ENG.pdf.
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the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights 
and freedoms of others.’69
The Equality Act 2010 protects individuals from discrimination because of a 
manifestation of their religion or belief through indirect discrimination where a ‘pro-
vision, criterion or practice’ is applied equally, whether or not individuals share the 
protected characteristic but places individuals who share the protected characteristic 
at a particular disadvantage in comparison to those who do not share the character-
istic, placing the individual at a disadvantage.70 However, unlike direct discrimina-
tion, indirect discrimination can be justified if it can be shown to be a ‘proportionate 
means of achieving a legitimate aim.’71
With reference to the above examples, a failure to provide a vegan food option or 
the imposition of a uniform policy is a ‘provision, criterion or practice’ which would 
clearly put an individual who is vegan at a disadvantage compared with a non-vegan. 
The question therefore is whether an employer or service provider can establish that 
the ‘provision, criterion or practice’ was a proportionate means of achieving a legiti-
mate aim. Section 19 of the Equality Act 2010 should be read compatibly with Arti-
cle 9(2) ECHR. What is proportionate will differ in every case, so the more serious 
the impact of the policy, criterion or practice, the greater the justification will need 
to be for implementing the policy.
Courts and tribunals will balance business needs against the impact on the group 
disadvantaged. In applying this to the above scenarios, it is likely that the provision 
of a vegan meal option or allowance of a suitable alternative uniform will suffice 
to negate any claims for indirect discrimination. However, an example where the 
Table 1  Factors determining a philosophical belief in England and Wales or a creed in Ontario, Canada
‘Philosophical belief’ under the Equality Act 2010 ‘Creed’ pursuant to Ontario Human Rights Com-
mission Policy on preventing discrimination based 
on creed
Must be genuinely held Is sincerely, freely and deeply held
Be a belief and not an opinion or viewpoint based 
on the present state of information available
Is integrally linked to a person’s identity, self-
definition and fulfilment
Be a belief as to a weighty and substantial aspect of 
human life and behaviour
Is a particular and comprehensive, overarching 
system of belief that governs one’s conduct and 
practices
Attain a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohe-
sion and importance
Addresses ultimate questions of human existence, 
including ideas about life, purpose, death, and the 
existence or non-existence of a Creator and/or a 
higher or different order of existence
69 ECHR art. 9(2).




A ‘Life-Style Choice’ or a Philosophical Belief?: The Argument…
provision, criterion or practice may be proportionate is a requirement for a vegan 
shop worker to handle notes, which are made with animal products, as the busi-
ness requires the handling of cash. Further, it may be appropriate to discipline an 
employee for proselytising about their vegan convictions if it violates the dignity of 
other workers.72
Individuals will also be protected from harassment which is defined as unwanted 
conduct related to a relevant protected characteristic which has the purpose or effect 
of violating their dignity, or creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating 
or offensive environment.73 As such, individuals will be protected from bullying or 
mockery due to their philosophical beliefs and/or the manifestation of those beliefs.
Similar types of discrimination are included within Title VII prohibiting dispa-
rate treatment,74 disparate impact,75 a failure to accommodate religion,76 and harass-
ment.77 The right to reasonable accommodation for religion protects those manifest-
ing their belief, and offers a greater degree of protection than indirect discrimination 
within England and Wales as there is no requirement to establish a disproportionate 
impact on a group, merely the individual.
Under the Canadian Human Rights Act, direct discrimination (or disparate treat-
ment) is unlawful within the prescribed areas,78 as is harassment79 and retaliation80 
(similar to victimisation). However, a discriminatory policy or practice is only appli-
cable to employment matters albeit there is no justification defence.81 Once again, 
different Provinces have their own anti-discrimination legislation.
Philosophy of Vegetarianism and Veganism
The concept of vegetarianism and veganism has been explored in the literature 
around animal ethics, with philosophers such as Peter Singer82 and Tom Regan83 
arguing for the abstaining of eating meat and potentially other animal derived 
products, albeit with differing philosophical underpinnings to come to this conclu-
sion. None are more aligned to the principles of ethical veganism, or abolitionist 
veganism, than Gary Francione, who argues that this diet rejects any use of animal 
72 Wasteney v East London NHS Foundation Trust UKEAT/0157/15/LA (England and Wales).
73 Equality Act 2010 section 26(1).
74 Similar to direct discrimination.
75 Similar to indirect discrimination.
76 42. U.S.C. §2000e-2(j).
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products, and is ‘the moral baseline for the animal rights movement.’84 He rejects 
any other reasons, or approaches, for animal rights, stating that environmental 
vegans, or philosophers such as Singer who may allow for the use of animals in 
certain circumstances, are not really vegans, and do not see veganism as a “philoso-
phy of living” but merely a lifestyle.85 Thus, those who are serious about the animal 
rights movement are those who adopt this philosophy in all aspects of their life, and 
accept that animal lives have moral significance, rejecting their current commodity 
status.86 Francione takes his abolitionist view further than food, and argues that we 
should not have companion animals (though he himself has dogs he sees as ‘refu-
gees’) and should cease to bring domesticated non-human animals into existence, 
purely for our benefit.87 This is the same as in Casamitjana Costa, where the Claim-
ant did not live with a companion animal.
Ethical and environmental vegans ‘make their choices in line with their core val-
ues. They want to live in alignment with their beliefs.’88 Thus, in order to do so, they 
change the way in which they live their life, adhering to a set of rules which looks 
to minimise the detrimental impacts a non-vegan life can have on sentient beings 
and the environment. This can be seen as the practice Ahimsa, the vow of non-
injury, the prime practice in Jainism. Apparently, all ‘Jainas are strict vegetarians, 
living solely on one-sense beings (vegetables) and milk products. Alcohol, honey, 
and certain kinds of fig are also prohibited, because they are said to harbour many 
forms of life.’89 Thus, it can be seen how veganism has developed from the practice 
of Ahimsa, taking the vow of non-injury further and modernised it, to incorporate 
other forms of nonviolence, such as cosmetic and medical products and clothing, 
which has come at the expense of violence to animals. It is important to note that the 
philosophy of Ahimsa also extends to non-injury to the environment, and has been 
argued to be capable of addressing current bio-diversity issues the planet is facing.90 
Thus, though animal rights advocates, such as Francione, argue that ethical vegan-
ism is the only way to project animals to a higher moral and legal standing and pro-
duce consistent behaviour, it seems that environmental vegans and their beliefs are 
also encapsulated by the teachings of Ahimsa and the philosophy on non-injury. The 
teachings of Ahimsa were discussed in Casamitjana Costa, and it was highlighted 
that the Claimant lived his life in line with these teachings and beliefs, which will be 
discussed in more detail below.
84 Gary L. Francione, Some Thoughts on the Meaning of Vegan, Abolitionist Approach (18 October 
2009) https ://www.aboli tioni stapp roach .com/some-thoug hts-on-the-meani ng-of-vegan /.
85 Id.
86 Gary L. Francione, Reflections on Animals, Property, and the Law and Rain without Thunder, 70 Law 
& Contemp. Probs. 9 (2007).
87 Gary L. Francione, Animal Rights: The Abolitionist Approach, 224–28 (Exempla Press 2015).
88 Kelsey Steele, ‘The Vegan Journey: An Exploration of Vegan Experiences with Vegan from Burling-
ton, Vermont’ Vermont, Environmental Studies Electronic Thesis Collection 23, University of Vermont, 
15 (2013).
89 Christopher Key Chapple, Nonviolence to Animals, Earth and Self in Asian Traditions 10 (State Uni-
versity of New York Press, 1993).
90 Kavita Bhatt, ‘Ahimsa: The Jain’s Strategy for the Conservation of Biodiversity’, as found in Indoo 
Pandey Khanduri (Ed) Human Freedom and Environment: Contemporary Paradigms and Moral Strate-
gies 302 (Kalpaz Publications, 2010).
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There are arguments which seek to undermine the philosophy and practice of 
ethical veganism, however, and they should be addressed. Some people argue that 
ethical veganism does not, for example, minimise the suffering of animals, due to 
how many animals are killed in fields from the ploughing of fields and harvesting 
of vegetables and grains.91 Therefore, ‘a vegan diet doesn’t necessarily mean a diet 
that doesn’t interfere with the lives of animals.’92 This is true, and in the process of 
gathering food, whether on an industrial or home-grown organic scale, there will 
be other beings harmed in the process. Francione argues that this is unavoidable, 
and all human actions have consequences, some of them adverse. This is no reason, 
though, to argue against the use of animals and the intentional harm humans cause 
to them.93 This is the thinking that helped the Claimant in Casamitjana Costa, and 
the fact that he would only use animal by-products where there was no other alterna-
tive, and only after exhausting all reasonable steps ‘to ensure that his consumption 
contributes as little as possible to the suffering and/or exploitation of sentient beings 
no matter how remote that is.’94 This was to the extent of food products, such as figs, 
which he believed would cause harm, and is consistent with the practices of Ahimsa. 
Whilst the argument of unintentional harm is valid, it does not affect the beliefs held 
by ethical vegans.
Veganism and Vegetarianism Dissected
There is a clear distinction between veganism and other kinds of non-meat diets, and 
there is a large variety of diets available. For example, pescatarians do not eat meat, 
but eat fish and other seafood, as well as other animal derived products, like milk, 
eggs and cheese. Vegetarians do not eat meat, including ingredients such as gelatine, 
but eat other animal derived products. Vegans, on the other hand, do not eat any ani-
mal derived products, including honey. It is defined by the Vegan Society as ‘a way 
of living which seeks to exclude, as far as is possible and practicable, all forms of 
exploitations of, and cruelty to, animals for food, clothing or any other purpose.’95 
This has been a gradual shift in movement from a promotion of a vegetarian diet to 
a vegan diet, starting in the early 1900’s in the UK, where the Vegetarian Society 
broke off into two strands with some asking for vegetarians to refrain from eating 
eggs, milk and products made with them.96 Leneman states that the main argument 
91 Steven L. Davis, The Least Harm Principle May Require that Humans Consume a Diet Containing 
Large Herbivores, Not a Vegan Diet, as found in S. Armstrong and R. Botzler (Eds), The Animal Ethics 
Reader (3rd edn, Routledge 2016).
92 Id. 267.
93 Gary L. Francione, Animal Rights: The Abolitionist Approach (Exempla Press 2015).
94 Casamitjana Costa v The League Against Cruel Sports [2020] UK ET 3331129/2018, para 17 (Eng-
land and Wales).
95 The Vegan Society, Definition of Veganism, https ://www.vegan socie ty.com/go-vegan /defin ition -vegan 
ism.
96 Leah Leneman, No Animal Food: The Road to Veganism in Britain, Britain 7(3) Society and Animals 
219, 221 (1999).
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for a vegan diet was ‘always the cruelty, inseparable from the acquisition of dairy 
products, and the linkage of the meat and dairy industries.’97 There were, however, 
other arguments including health and consistency with the philosophy.98 Thus, it is 
necessary to explore why individuals choose to go vegetarian or vegan, before going 
on to discuss in depth the different kinds of diets. There are other influencing factors 
for going vegetarian or vegan, including religion and as part of the feminist move-
ment, but for the purposes of this article and focusing on protected philosophical 
beliefs, only factory farming, animal welfare, the environment, health, and working 
conditions in slaughter houses will be discussed.
The Farming Industry
It is no longer a secret that the farming industry has industrialised and, as a result, 
intensive farming practices have ensued.99 Harrison acknowledges that as ‘people 
become richer, they tend to want more meat, with the result that more and more 
animals are being farmed for food.’100 Since the publication of Animal Machines 
in 1964,101 which first exposed the suffering inflicted on animals in factory farms, 
there have been some significant changes, particularly in the EU and the UK. For 
example, veal crates, which restrict the movement of calves who are usually tied by 
their necks, have been banned in the UK since 1990,102 and the EU brought in a ban 
in 2006.103 These crates, however, are still legal in countries such as the US. Whilst 
there have been some significant improvements, there are certain pressures con-
tributing to intensive farming, such as population growth, urbanization, economic 
growth and nutrition transition.104 As a result of this demand, the farming industry 
has developed to incorporate increasing use of technology, (such as artificial insemi-
nation, and advanced feeding systems), suffered structural changes (influenced by 
factors such as cost reduction), and lessened the restraints of local resources, (such 
as the rise of supermarkets).105
These intensive farming practices are having a negative impact on animal wel-
fare, the environment, public health, and the welfare of slaughter house workers.
97 Id. 222.
98 Id.
99 David DeGrazia, Meat Eating, as found in S. Armstrong and R. Botzler (Eds), The Animal Ethics 
Reader (3rd edn, Routledge 2016).
100 Marian Stamp Dawkins, Why We Still Need to Read Animal Machines, as found in Ruth Harrison, 
Animal Machines, 2 (First published 1964, 2013 CABI).
101 Ruth Harrison, Animal Machines (First published 1964, 2013 CABI).
102 The current legislation is the Welfare of Farmed Animals (England) Regulations 2000.
103 Council Directive 2008/119/EEC.
104 Henning Steinfeld et al., Livestock’s Long Shadow: Environmental Issues and Options, 7–11 (Food 
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Animal Welfare
Compassion in World Farming state that 74 billion animals are reared for food each 
year, with 50 billion reared for food through intensive farming on factory farms.106 
There are many animals which are reared for food, including, but not limited to, cat-
tle, pigs, sheep and chickens, and those who are reared on factory farms face dismal 
living conditions before slaughter. As stated above, this was brought to light in the 
UK through the book Animal Machines,107 but there are others who have shed light 
on the conditions such as Peter Singer in Animal Liberation,108 PETA and Compas-
sion in World Farming. The conditions in which animals live on these farms are too 
extensive to fully outline in this article, but a small discussion will illustrate how 
they contribute to the factors of becoming a vegan or vegetarian and the philosophy 
of such practices.
Compassion in World Farming state that there are more than 50 billion chickens 
reared annually for food, either broiler chickens or egg-laying hens,109 making them 
the most farmed animal in the world. For example,110 in the UK there were 157,000 
cattle slaughtered in April 2020,111 compared to 104 million broiler chickens in 
the same month.112 On these farms, chickens are often kept in battery cages,113 no 
larger than a single sheet of A4 paper, which restricts them from exhibiting normal 
behaviour patterns, such as nesting or foraging for food.114 Further, due to crowd-
ing, egg-laying hens feather-peck each other, leading to injuries. As a result, it is 
practice to de-beak the bird, removing a part of the beak with a hot blade and no aes-
thetic.115 Broiler chickens are kept in barns with no natural lighting, and are barren 
apart from food and water. They are bred to grow intensively, resulting in their legs 
not being able to carry their weight and suffer from leg disorders. Many die in these 
106 Compassion in World Farming, Strategic Plan 2018–2022: Working Together to End Factory Farm-
ing Worldwide https ://asset s.ciwf.org/media /74328 24/ciwf_strat egic-plan-revis e18-lr2.pdf.
107 Ruth Harrison, Animal Machines (First published 1964, 2013 CABI).
108 Peter Singer, Animal Liberation (Random House 1975).
109 Compassion in World Farming, Farm Animals: Chickens, < https ://www.ciwf.org.uk/farm-anima ls/
chick ens/> accessed 5.06.20.
110 It should be noted that these statistics were recorded during the Covid-19 pandemic and may not be 
as representative of how many animals are slaughtered due to the issues faced by farmers.
111 Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, United Kingdom Slaughter Statistics—April 
2020 (14th May 2020) https ://asset s.publi shing .servi ce.gov.uk/gover nment /uploa ds/syste m/uploa ds/attac 
hment _data/file/88494 4/slaug hter-stats notic e-14may 20.pdf.
112 Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, United Kingdom Poultry and Poultry Meat 
Statistics—April 2020 (21st May 2020) https ://asset s.publi shing .servi ce.gov.uk/gover nment /uploa ds/
syste m/uploa ds/attac hment _data/file/88640 7/poult ry-stats notic e-21may 20.pdf.
113 It must be noted that battery cages are now banned in some parts of the world. For example, the EU 
effectively banned battery cages in 2012 through Directive 1999/74/EC. They are still used in the USA, 
however. For more information, please see: Jessica Braunschweig-Norris, The U.S. Egg Industry - Not 
All It’s Cracked up to Be for the Welfare of the Laying Hen: A Comparative Look at United States and 
European Union Welfare Laws, 10 Drake J. Agric. L. 511 (2005).
114 Whitney R. Morgan, Proposition Animal Welfare: Enabling an Irrational Public or Empowering Con-
sumers to Align Advertising Depictions with Reality, 26 U. Fla. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 297 (2015).
115 Id.
222 P. McKeown, R. A. Dunn 
1 3
sheds from excessive heat, heart attacks, and ammonia pollution produced by their 
droppings.116 This is one example of the animal welfare issues on factory farms, but 
there are many conditions deemed to be ‘common practice’ which result in immense 
suffering for various animals, such as cows, pigs and sheep.
Vegans, particularly ethical vegans, take the point of animal welfare further, and 
their philosophy is influenced by other animal welfare issues outside of factory 
farms. For example, strict ethical vegans do not eat honey, as they believe the har-
vesting of honey does not abide by their definition of veganism, and it exploits the 
bees involved in the process.117 The honey industry can involve specific breeding of 
honey bees to increase productivity and clipping the wings of queen bees to prevent 
them setting up a colony elsewhere. Further, there are many animal welfare issues 
associated with industries such as fur,118 cosmetic and medical testing,119 and ani-
mals used in entertainment.120 Clearly our use of animals raises ethical and moral 
questions, those which vegans, and perhaps to a lesser extent vegetarians, have 
answered with abolishing any involvement with such industries and choosing to live 
a life which does not contribute to such welfare violations. After all, the consumer 
is somewhat responsible for the continuation of such suffering of animals, and to 
reduce this responsibility DeGrazia argues we should live by the following moral 
rule: ‘make every reasonable effort not to provide financial support to institutions 
that cause extensive unnecessary harm.’121
Environmental Factors
It is becoming more prominent that current farming practices, whether that be for 
food or other industries such as factory and fur farming, are causing an impact on 
our environment. The Pew Commission reported that there are three main causes of 
environmental degradation resulting from intensive farming: large volumes of ani-
mal waste, the disposal of these materials and unsustainable water usage and soil 
degradation associated with feed.122 There are other issues, including factory farm-
ing releasing large amounts of toxic air emission, such as ammonia, causing a risk 
116 Compassion in World Farming, Farm Animals: Chickens Farmed for Meat https ://www.ciwf.org.uk/
farm-anima ls/chick ens/meat-chick ens/.
117 The Vegan Society, The Honey Industry https ://www.vegan socie ty.com/go-vegan /why-go-vegan /
honey -indus try.
118 For example, please see, Rachel Dunn, For Fur’s Sake: Can the UK Can Imports of Fur from Other 
Countries?, 3(1) The UK Journal of Animal Law 42 (2019).
119 For example, please see, Peter Singer, Animal Liberation (Random House 1975).
120 For example, please see, Trevor J. Smith, Bullhooks and the Law: Is Pain and Suffering the Elephant 
in the Room? 19(2) Animal Law Review 423 (2013).
121 David DeGrazia, Meat Eating, as found in S. Armstrong and R. Botzler (Eds), The Animal Ethics 
Reader 428 (3rdedn, Routledge 201).
122 Pew Commission, Environmental Impact of Industrial Farm Animal Production: A Report of the Pew 
Commission on Industrial Farm Animal Production https ://www.lclar k.edu/live/files /6699-envir onmen 
tal-impac t-of-indus trial -farm-anima l.
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to public health.123 Waste can also disturb the environment, and the enjoyment of it, 
in other ways, such as the odours from poultry facilities attracting flies and rodents, 
which can carry disease.124
Land degradation is a common result of unsustainable agricultural practices, 
and ‘refers to a temporary or permanent decline in the productive capacity of the 
land of its potential for environmental management.’125 This not only damages the 
environment, but can also affect national food supply, trade and malnutrition.126 
The decrease in the usage of this land due to degradation reduces productivity, and 
therefore has an economic consequence for farmers, pushing farmland into natural 
habitats, causing land destruction. This impacts on climate change, loss of biodiver-
sity and depletion of water resources.127 With regard to climate change, it is becom-
ing increasingly clear that greenhouse gas emissions are severely contributed to by 
animal agriculture, and agriculture is ‘directly responsible’ for approximately 20% 
of greenhouse gasses produced by human-generated emissions.128 By lowering the 
number of intensively farmed animals, we can lower the impact on climate change. 
Further, it is predicted that climate change will make it harder to produce enough 
food needed to meet growing population demands.129 It is important to recognise 
that some non-meat diets can also negatively contribute to climate change, and there 
needs to be consideration still as to which products are consumed in order for the 
positive impacts to be fully realised.130
Lastly, there is ‘easily enough grain protein, if used sensibly, to feed every human 
on earth.’131 Not only could this grain protein be used to feed humans rather than 
animals, but the amount of energy (calories) livestock feed consumes is almost 43%, 
and animal products return 29%, making it an inefficient system.132 The amount 
123 Liam H. Michener, Meating America’s Demand: An Analysis of the Hidden Costs of Factory Farm-
ing and Alternate Methods of Food Production, 7 J. Animal & Envtl. L. 145 (2015).
124 P. Gerber, C. Opio and H. Steinfeld, Poultry production and the environment—a review, Animal Pro-
duction and Health Division, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 3 http://www.
fao.org/ag/again fo/home/event s/bangk ok200 7/docs/part2 /2_2.pdf.
125 Sara J. Scherr and Satya Yadav, Land Degradation in the Developing World: Implications for Food, 
Agriculture, and the Environment to 2020, Food, Agriculture, and the Environment Discussion Paper 14, 
3 (1996).
126 Id. 7.
127 Henning Steinfeld et al, Livestock’s Long Shadow: Environmental Issues and Options 29 (Food & 
Agriculture Org 2006).
128 Leo Horrigan, Robert S. Lawrence and Polly Walker, How Sustainable Agriculture Can Address the 
Environmental and Human Harms of Industrial Agriculture, 110(5) Environmental Health Perspectives 
445, 448 (2002).
129 Compassion in World Farming, Beyond Factory Farming: Sustainable Solutions for Animals, Peo-
ple and the Planet 39 (2009) https ://www.compa ssion infoo dbusi ness.com/media /38170 96/beyon d-facto 
ry-farmi ng-repor t.pdf.
130 Bingli Clark Chai et al, Which Diet has the Least Environmental Impact on our planet? A Systematic 
Review or Vegan, Vegetarian and Omnivorous Diets, 11(15) Sustainability 4410 (2019).
131 David DeGrazia, Meat Eating, as found in S. Armstrong and R. Botzler (Eds), The Animal Ethics 
Reader 428 (3rdedn, Routledge 2016).
132 Compassion in World Farming, Beyond Factory Farming: Sustainable Solutions for Animals, Peo-
ple and the Planet 36 (2009) https ://www.compa ssion infoo dbusi ness.com/media /38170 96/beyon d-facto 
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224 P. McKeown, R. A. Dunn 
1 3
calories used to feed animals could, therefore, be used directly as human food, creat-
ing an annual calorie need for over 3.5 million people.133
Health
The impact of intensive farming on rural communities has been researched, noting 
detrimental effects on physical health, mental health, and social health. For example, 
Horrigan et al. note how pollution from factory farms harms the health of workers 
and residents, causing respiratory diseases such as asthma, bronchitis and organic 
dust toxic syndrome.134 This is caused by the environmental impacts, discussed 
above.
Factory farms also use antibiotics and hormones, as a way to limit diseases in 
livestock and promote growth and weight gain.135 However, this has caused anti-
microbial resistance in the environment, and more drug resistant infections have 
increased in humans. In fact, it is becoming such an issue that the World Health 
Organisation has asked that farmers and the food industry refrain from routinely 
using antibiotics.136 Some countries have, and the EU banned the use of antibiotics 
for growth production in 2006.137 The reasons for this are the serious health implica-
tions this resistance can have for human health. For example, LA-MRSA identified 
in pig production is a health risk for the farmers and veterinarians who come into 
contact with the animals and, though it is unclear what the public health relevance 
is of consuming contaminated meat, it has been found in pork and meat products.138
As well as antimicrobial resistance, other concerns with factory farming include 
the transmission of zoonotic diseases from animals to humans, becoming increas-
ingly more common and prevalent. Morse et al. outline how no pandemic pathogens 
have been predicted before appearing in humans,139 though over 70% of emerging 
infection diseases in humans are zoonotic.140 For example, the current Covid-19 
pandemic is thought to have started in a wet-market in Wuhan, China, which sold 
133 Christian Nellemann et al, The Environmental Food Crisis: The Environment’s Role in Averting 
Future Food Crises, 27 (2009) https ://www.gwp.org/globa lasse ts/globa l/toolb ox/refer ences /the-envir 
onmen tal-crisi s.-the-envir onmen ts-role-in-avert ing-futur e-food-crise s-unep-2009.pdf.
134 Leo Horrigan, Robert S. Lawrence and Polly Walker, How Sustainable Agriculture Can Address the 
Environmental and Human Harms of Industrial Agriculture, 110(5) Environmental Health Perspectives 
445, 451 (2002).
135 Ian Phillips et al, Does the use of antibiotics in food animals pose a risk to human health? A critical 
review of published data, 53(1) Journal of Antimicrobial Chemotherapy 28 (2004).
136 World Health Organisation, Stop using antibiotics in healthy animals to prevent the spread of anti-
biotic resistance (7 November 2017) https ://www.who.int/news-room/detai l/07-11-2017-stop-using -antib 
iotic s-in-healt hy-anima ls-to-preve nt-the-sprea d-of-antib iotic -resis tance .
137 Regulation 1831/2003/EC.
138 Brigit Lassok and Bernd-Alois Tenhagen, From Pig to Pork: Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus 
aureus in the Pork Production Chain, 76(6) Journal of Food Production 1095 (2013).
139 Stephen S Morse et al, Prediction and prevention of the next pandemic zoonosis, 380(9857) Lancet 
1956 (2012).
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wildlife as meat.141 These issues aren’t isolated to wet-markets, however, and there 
are many opportunities for animal diseases to jump to humans. Morse et al. identify 
three stages to assess pandemic potential, the first being no human infection, but 
factors can contribute to transmission between hosts, expanding within its popula-
tion, and be transmitted to other non-human populations, increasing likeliness of 
transmission to humans. Moving of livestock and transportation of wildlife for food 
can all contribute to a stage 1 emergence.142 The Food and Agriculture Organisation 
have stressed that transport systems are ‘ideally suited for spreading disease, as the 
animals commonly originate from different herds or flocks and are confined together 
for long periods in poorly ventilated, stressful environments.’143 However, there are 
also cases of animal–animal and animal-human disease being spread from animals 
transported for use in research, horses moved for equestrian competitions, and in the 
exotic pet trade.144
Another health aspect to take into consideration is the health benefits which come 
with a low meat, or non-meat, diet. It has been shown that high meat consumption, 
particularly of red meat, can cause cancers, heart disease, type 2 diabetes, and absti-
nence from meat products, even a vegetarian diet, can significantly lower mortal-
ity rates from these illnesses.145 It is important to highlight, however, that there are 
some health negatives from following these diets, however, particularly with vegan-
ism which can cause some deficiencies if not substituted adequately.146
Workers
There is less focus on the working conditions in factory farms and slaughterhouses, 
but it is becoming more discussed. In the Global South, such as Kenya, very few 
slaughterhouses provide their workers with protective equipment and hand wash-
ing facilities, and a high level of illnesses is reported.147 In western societies, there 
are still dangers associated with the job, mainly due to speed at which slaughterers 
have to work in order to meet targets. Injuries include musculoskeletal injuries, such 
as carpal tunnel syndrome, and more life-threatening injuries, often with the knives 
used to cut through bone.148 Workers have reported being crushed by animals falling 
141 For example, please see Jimmy Whitworth, COVIDCOVID-19: A fast evolving pandemic, 114(4) 
Transactions of the Royal Society of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene 241(2020).
142 Stephen S Morse et al, Prediction and prevention of the next pandemic zoonosis, 380(9857) Lancet 
1956 (2012).
143 FOA Animal Production and Health Paper, Improved animal health for poverty reduction and sus-
tainable livelihoods 19 (2002) http://www.fao.org/3/a-y3542 e.pdf.
144 Michael Greger, The Human/Animal Interface: Emergence and Resurgence of Zoonotic Infectious 
Diseases, 33(4) Critical Reviews in Microbiology 243 (2007).
145 Alessandra Petti et al, Vegetarianism and veganism: not only benefits but also gaps. A Review, 19(3) 
Progress in Nutrition 229, 231 (2017).
146 F Phillips, Vegetarian nutrition, British Nutrition Foundation: Briefing Paper (2005).
147 Elizabeth Anne Jessie Cook et al, Working conditions and public health risks in slaughterhouses in 
western Kenya, 17 BMC Public Health (2017).
148 Jennifer Dillard, A Slaughterhouse Nightmare: Psychological Harm Suffered by Slaughterhouse 
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out of apparatus or kicked by them as they struggle.149 There are even deaths caused 
by poisonous fumes being inhaled while cleaning a blood-collection tank.150
Accounts of emotional and mental health of slaughterers being affected have 
emerged, leading to alcohol related problems and even suicide.151 This has been 
confirmed by research, which found that slaughterers during the initial stages of 
their employment had frequent vivid dreams about their work, feeling guilt and 
shame. In order to deal with these emotions, workers adopt psychological defences 
and become emotionally detached from their work. This can lead to expressions of 
anger which spill over into the home as abuse and violence.152 Though there is no 
evidence of a vegan of vegetarian choosing to adopt the belief because of this issue, 
with emerging research and information it may become an influencing factor.
There is also an issue with the wages of slaughterers which have fallen below that 
of an average manufacturing wage,153 to maintain production speed despite more 
meat being produced, and workers not being allowed to go to the toilet and wearing 
adult diapers or refraining from urinating and causing health issues.154 The condi-
tions for workers is clearly a very important issue, and one that Muller says to ignore 
‘is to ignore a key corner of the intersectional labyrinth that is the pursuit of social 
justice.’155
Different Branches of Veganism and Vegetarianism
How people practice veganism does differ, and a study found that those who ‘cre-
ated and abided by personal, idiosyncratic definitions of veganism, which were con-
siderably less strict and often included dairy products and honey’, compared to those 
who followed the rules set by the Vegan Society.156 As stated above, there are vari-
ous reasons why one becomes a vegan, and Greenebaum separates vegans into three 
district categories: health, environmental and ethical vegans.157 The authors would 
149 Gail A. Eisnitz, Slaughterhouse: The Shocking Story of Greed, Neglect, and Inhumane Treatment 
Inside the US Meat Industry (Prometheus Books 2006).
150 Stephanie Marek Muller, Zombification, Social Death, and the Slaughterhouse: U.S. Industrial Prac-
tices of Livestock Slaughter, 53(3) American Studies 81 (2018).
151 BBC News: Stories, Confessions of a slaughterhouse worker (6th January 2020) https ://www.bbc.
co.uk/news/stori es-50986 683.
152 Karen Victor and Antoni Barnard, Slaughtering for a living: A Hermeneutic phenomenological per-
spective on the well-being of slaughterhouse employees, 11 International Journal of Qualitative Studies 
in Health and Well-being (2016).
153 Jennifer Dillard, A Slaughterhouse Nightmare: Psychological Harm Suffered by Slaughterhouse 
Employees and the Possibility of Redress through Legal Reform, 15 Geo. J. on Poverty L. & Pol’y 391 
(2008).
154 Oxfam Research Report, Lives on the Line: The Human Cost of Cheap Chicken (2015) https ://
s3.amazo naws.com/oxfam -us/www/stati c/media /files /Lives _on_the_Line_Full_Repor t_Final .pdf.
155 Stephanie Marek Muller, Zombification, Social Death, and the Slaughterhouse: U.S. Industrial Prac-
tices of Livestock Slaughter, 53(3) American Studies 81, 82 (2018).
156 Elizabeth Cherry, Veganism as a Cultural Movement: A Relational Approach, 5(2) Social Movement 
Studies 155, 156 (2006).
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actually add another kind of vegan which, whilst has links to other groups of vegans, 
has its own distinct set of characteristics: the humanitarian vegan. There was not 
any previous research found, which explored this kind of vegan, though some may 
mention it as an influencing factor and link it to environmental factors, and it may be 
because there is not enough awareness of these issues. Nonetheless, the authors felt 
it important to include. Not all of the issues discussed in the previous sections will 
influence an individual to become vegan, but can be factors in the decision to follow 
the diet and lifestyle.
What becomes more complicated is where vegetarianism fits into the argu-
ment, with some people putting ethical vegetarianism and veganism in the same 
category.158 Further, there was less literature which focused solely on ethical veg-
etarianism, and some which referred to ethical veganism as ‘strict vegetarianism’.159 
The main difference is that, whilst both abstain from eating meat, not all vegetar-
ians will refrain from eating other animal derived products (e.g. eggs) or using ani-
mal derived products (e.g. leather), but some will. The differences and similarities 
between the groups can be different for each individual, and it is not simple to state 
that vegans have a stronger ethical belief than vegetarians do. Veganism is a rela-
tively newer concept, when one considers the history and development of vegetari-
anism, and veganism, outside of religion, began as a concern for animal welfare.160 
There are different strands of vegetarianism, such as lacto-ovo vegetarians, who do 
not eat meat, but eat diary and eggs, or ovo vegetarians, who include eggs in their 
diet, but not meat or milk/milk products.161 The underpinning beliefs of animal wel-
fare and environmental practices may be the same, but the practice of those beliefs 
may vary,162 and it is not only veganism, but also vegetarianism, which can be seen 
as  ‘being about defining the self, defining who one is, what sort of being one is, 
what it is to be human and the relationship one has with the non-human…’163 Thus, 
due to the consistent grouping of these terms, they are discussed together, but some 
of the differences are highlighted throughout the discussions
Figure  1 displays the different kinds of vegans, and the general characteristics 
which contribute to their belief and identity based on previous research which has 
explored these influencing factors:
Munroe’s research argues that ethical vegetarianism is part of the animal wel-
fare movement, a kind of DIY activism, ‘used by activists to publicize an issue as 
158 For example, Lisa Johnson, The Religion of Ethical Veganism, 5(1) Journal of Animal Ethics 31 
(2015).
159 Rebecca Schwartz, Employers, Got Vegan: How Ethical Veganism Qualifies for Religious Protection 
under Title VII, 24 Animal L. 221, 224 (2018).
160 Please see David Newton, Vegetarianism and Veganism: A Reference Handbook (Contemporary 
World Issues) (ABC-CLIO 2019) 38–41; Leah Leneman, No Animal Food: The Road to Veganism in 
Britain, 7(3) Society and Animals 219 (1999).
161 Id. 40.
162 Swinder Janda and Phillip J. Trocchia, Vegetarianism: Toward a Greater Understanding, 18(12) Psy-
chology and Marketing 1205 (2001).
163 Malcolm Hamilton, Eating Ethically: ‘Spiritual’ and’Quasi-Religious’ Aspects of Vegetarianism, 
15(1) Journal of Contemporary Religion 65, 69 (2000).
228 P. McKeown, R. A. Dunn 
1 3
well as to disrupt life in its immediate vicinity.’164 To disrupt this life even further, 
ethical vegans do not use any animal derived products at all, including those in cos-
metics or clothing. Greenebaum states an ethical vegan is someone who ‘adopts a 
vegan diet for moral, ethical and political reasons. The diet forms only part of a life-
style that is structured around philosophy of animal rights.’165 Further, her research 
found that ethical vegan participants saw veganism as a belief and ‘“liv[ing] in a 
connected way to the world around you.”’166 Their philosophy was so strong that the 
ethical vegan participants did not like the approach of the health vegans, stating that 
the purpose of giving up animal products is to no longer harm animals, not to lose 
weight. Maxim groups the health and environmental rationales together, stating they 
are merely dietary preferences.167 The authors would not necessarily agree with this, 
as ethical, environmental and humanitarian vegans all have an external factor which 
drives their belief in veganism and dictates how they live, whether this be the treat-
ment of animals or the influence on climate change. A health vegan is the only kind 
which has an internal driving force, usually the need to control, or prevent, an illness 
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Fig. 1  Different kinds of vegans and influencing factors
164 Lyle Munro, Strategies, Action Repertoires and DIT Activism in the Animal Rights Movement, 4(1) 
Social Movement Studies 75, 76 (2005).
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These findings are consistent with other studies, where the driving factor for 
becoming a vegan was animal welfare issues, followed by health considerations.168 
Mann’s study also found that an influencing factor was that a vegan diet can feed 
more people, linking into arguments of humanitarian veganism outlined above, as 
well as the impacts on the environment.169 Further, a quarter of participants reported 
being vegetarian, before making the change to veganism, some as a purposeful tran-
sition into veganism, and some ultimately moving that way to further eliminate ani-
mal cruelty.170 Interestingly, two vegans in this study who stated they did not fol-
low a vegan lifestyle solely became vegans for health purposes.171 There are some 
studies which show, however, that the driving factor for becoming a vegan was for 
health reasons.172 Thus, the reasons for becoming a vegetarian or vegan are com-
plex, multi-faceted, and can evolve and change over time.
Is Veganism and Vegetarianism a Protected Philosophical Belief?
Vegan convictions have long been held to fall within the scope of Article 9 ECHR 
following the 1993 decision in W v the United Kingdom.173 However, whether 
veganism and vegetarianism are protected philosophical beliefs has only recently 
been tested in the domestic courts and tribunals of England and Wales.174
In 2011, an Employment Tribunal in Hashman v Milton Park (Dorset) Limited t/a 
Orchard Park found belief in the sanctity of life to fall within the definition of philo-
sophical belief.175 Beliefs in the sanctity of life incorporated ‘beliefs in the value of 
life or veganism, environmentalism and animal rights activism.’176 As such, it was 
clearly arguable that veganism and vegetarianism could be regarded as philosophical 
beliefs.





172 Laura Jennings et al, Exploring Perceptions of Veganism, (2019) https://arxiv.org/pdf/1907.12567.
pdf.
173 W v the United Kingdom (App No 18187/91) Commission Decision 10 February 1993; see also 
European Court of Human Rights ‘Guide on Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights: 
Freedom of thought, conscience and religion’ (30 April 2020), para.17(c); This case concerned a vegan 
prisoner who objected to working in a print shop because his beliefs prevented him from working with 
products tested on animals (i.e. the dyes). It should be noted that the United Kingdom Government did 
not contest whether veganism was protected under Article 9 ECHR. The case was determined on the 
basis that the applicant had not exhausted his domestic remedies.
174 ‘Vegetarianism’ has been cited as an ‘uncontroversial’ example of a belief that would fall within the 
scope of Article 9 See Regina v Secretary of State for Education and Employment & Others (Respond-
ents) ex parte Williamson (Appellant) & Others [2005] UK HL 15, para.55 (England and Wales).
175 Hashman v Milton Park (Dorset) Limited t/a Orchard Park [2011] ET 3105555/2009 (England and 
Wales); the case concerned the definition of ‘philosophical belief’ within the context of the Employment 
Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003.
176 Id. para. 55; the case particularly related to the Claimant’s belief in anti-hunt activism.
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There was discussion during the passage of the Equality Bill through Parliament 
as to whether veganism and vegetarianism were included within the definition of 
philosophical belief, with Baroness Warsi stating:
…the weight of case law meant that only serious and important beliefs would 
be included as a religious or philosophical belief for the purposes of the law…
to include cults and other lifestyle choices such as veganism and vegetarianism 
is to make something of a farce of the debates that we had.177
This statement highlights that the inclusion of veganism and vegetarianism within 
the definition of philosophical belief was controversial, equating veganism and vege-
tarianism to a ‘cult’. The Equality and Human Rights Commission initially included 
veganism as an example of a belief attaining protection under the Equality Act stat-
ing in draft guidance:
A person who is a vegan chooses not to use or consume animal products of 
any kind. That person eschews the exploitation of animals for food, clothing, 
accessories or any other purpose and does so out of an ethical commitment to 
animal welfare. This person is likely to hold a belief which is covered by the 
Act.178
The Government did not share the view that veganism was covered although 
accepted the decision was ultimately for the courts to determine.179 The above cited 
example of veganism as a protected belief did not appear in the final guidance.
In 2019, in Conisbee v Crossley Farms Limited and others,180 an Employment 
Tribunal rejected that vegetarianism was capable of being a philosophical belief 
within the meaning of the Equality Act 2010. The Claimant, a barman/waiter, 
alleged that he had been bullied during the course of his employment because he 
was a vegetarian.181 The Claimant’s vegetarianism stemmed from his belief ‘that the 
world would be a better place if animals were not killed for food.’182 It was accepted 
that the Claimant was a vegetarian, that he had a genuine belief in his vegetarian-
ism,183 and that the practice of vegetarianism was worthy of respect in a demo-
cratic society and not incompatible with human dignity.184 However, the tribunal 
concluded that the belief in vegetarianism was an opinion and view point,185 which 
177 House of Lords Debate, UK, 23 March 2010, vol 718, col 853.
178 Equality and Human Rights Commission: Draft Code of Practice Equality Act as stated Practical 
Law Employment: Religion or Belief Discrimination; See also House of Lords Debate, UK, 23 March 
2010, vol 718, col 852–853.
179 Practical Law Employment: Religion or Belief Discrimination.
180 Conisbee v Crossley Farms Limited and others [2019] ET 3335357/2018 (England and Wales).
181 The Claimant alleged that a colleague had called him ‘gay’ because he was a vegetarian (para.56) 
whilst he
 was also shouted at in front of customers - Conisbee v Crossley Farms Limited and others [2019] ET
 3335357/2018 (England and Wales) para.7.
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could not be described as a weighty and substantial aspect of human life and behav-
iour, merely a life style choice.186 Finally, the tribunal concluded that the Claim-
ant’s belief did not attain the required level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and 
importance as vegetarians could adopt the practice for many different reasons such 
as lifestyle, health, diet, concern about the way animals are raised or indeed, per-
sonal taste.187 Further, the tribunal stated that the belief did not have a similar status 
or cogency to that of religion.188
In contrast to Conisbee, ethical veganism was held to be a philosophical belief 
in the subsequent Employment Tribunal case, Casamitjana Costa v The League 
Against Cruel Sports,189 decided in January 2020. The Claimant alleged that he had 
been dismissed after he wrote to colleagues advising them that their pensions were 
being invested in non-ethical funds, specifically pharmaceutical and tobacco com-
panies known to engage in animal testing, and the only ethical fund offered by their 
employer offered worse rates of return than other ethical funds on the market.190 
The Claimant alleged that the investments were ‘directly contradictory to the rea-
son for the existence and values of the organisation.’191 Further, the investment also 
contravened the Claimant’s beliefs as set out below. It is important to highlight that 
the judgments in both Casamitjana Costa and Conisbee are First Instance decisions, 
and therefore not binding. The decisions in these judgments may not be followed in 
other Employment Tribunals and may be reversed if appealed.192
The Claimant in Casamitjana Costa did not eat any animal products nor did he 
purchase any animal products, including products tested on animals; his beliefs had 
other consequences for his life.193 Examples include:
• He would not allow non-vegan food to be brought into his home by any other 
person;
• He would not consume food where he believed its production harmed animals in 
any way;
• He would not attend any spectacle involving live animals, including zoos, cir-
cuses and animal races;
• He would not live with an animal companion;




189 Casamitjana Costa v The League Against Cruel Sports [2020] ET 3331129/2018 (England and 
Wales).
190 Jordi Casamitjana, Help an Ethical Vegan who was dismissed by an Animal Welfare charity, www.
crowd justi ce.com/case/help-a-discr imina ted-ethic al-vegan /.
191 Id.
192 The authors have no knowledge of an appeal being lodged in the case of Conisbee whilst the parties 
settled in Casamitjana Costa (Casamitjana Costa v The League Against Cruel Sports [2020] UK ET 
3331129/2018 Consent Judgment (England and Wales)).
193 Casamitjana Costa v The League Against Cruel Sports [2020] ET 3331129/2018 (England and 
Wales) para.20.
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• He would not date a non-vegan nor share his property with anyone who was not 
vegan;
• If his destination was within an hour’s walking distance, the Claimant would 
normally walk rather than use public transport to avoid accidental crashes with 
insects or birds; and
• He would usually pay for purchases using with a credit card or coins, avoiding as 
far as possible notes which have been manufactured using animal products.194
It is interesting to contrast the rationale for the difference in finding vegetarianism 
not to be a philosophical belief whilst ethical veganism is regarded a philosophical 
belief.195
Opinion and Viewpoint
In Conisbee, the tribunal held that the ‘Claimant’s belief in vegetarianism was his 
opinion and viewpoint in that the world would be a better place if animals were not 
killed for food.{emphasis added}’.196 In Casamitjana Costa, the tribunal found that 
ethical veganism was more than an opinion and viewpoint stating:
…ethical veganism carries with it an important moral essential. That is so even 
if the Claimant may transgress on occasions. It is clear it is founded upon a 
longstanding tradition recognising the moral consequences of non-human ani-
mal sentience which has been upheld by both religious and atheists alike. Fur-
thermore, there is no doubt that the Claimant personally holds ethical vegan-
ism as a belief. He has clearly dedicated himself to that belief throughout what 
he eats, where he works, what he wears, the products he uses, where he shops 
and with whom he associates. It clearly is not simply a viewpoint, but a real 
and genuine belief and not just some irrational opinion.197{emphasis added}
It is difficult to reconcile the reasoning given in these two cases. In both cases, the 
Claimants established a belief in how humans used animals; the difference seem-
ingly the extent of that belief and its manifestation. In McClintock v Department of 
Constitutional Affairs,198 the Employment Appeal Tribunal differentiated a ‘belief’ 
from an ‘opinion or viewpoint’ stating:
…to constitute a belief there must be a religious or philosophical viewpoint 
in which one actually believes; it is not enough “to have an opinion based on 
194 Id.
195 Incidentally, both Conisbee and Casamitjana Costa were heard before the same Employment Judge.
196 Conisbee v Crossley Farms Limited and others [2019] ET 3335357/2018 (England and Wales)
 para.39.
197 Casamitjana Costa v The League Against Cruel Sports [2020] ET 3331129/2018 (England and 
Wales) para.34.
198 McClintock v Department of Constitutional Affairs UKEAT/0223/07/CEA (England and Wales).
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some real or perceived logic or based on information or lack of information 
available.”199
In Conisbee, the Claimant’s belief that the world would be a better place if animals 
were not killed for food appears to be just that: a belief. The judgment does not 
make any reference to any logic or information which would support the Claimant 
merely having an opinion or viewpoint. The Claimant in Conisbee asserted that it 
was ‘wrong and immoral to eat animals’.200 As such, there is an analogy with the 
reasoning in both Hashman v Milton Park (Dorset) Limited t/a Orchard Park201 and 
Casamitjana Costa. The common feature of all these cases is the belief in the rela-
tionship between humans and animals. However, it is perhaps the case that sanctity 
of life encompasses beliefs in the value of life or veganism, environmentalism and 
animal rights activism, thus impacting upon the individual’s life to a greater extent 
than merely adopting a vegetarian diet. Similarly, veganism, particularly in the case 
of Casamitjana Costa, also has a significant impact upon the individual’s daily life. 
This, however, suggests that the test in some way relies upon the extent and manifes-
tation of the belief and therefore the test has been wrongly applied, as the law does 
not provide that the manifestation belief has to be extreme or applicable to every 
aspect on the individual’s life.
Lifestyle Choice
In Conisbee, whilst acknowledging the Claimant’s belief in vegetarianism was an 
‘admirable sentiment’, the tribunal determined that it was a lifestyle choice that 
could not ‘altogether be described as relating to weight and substantial aspect of 
human life and behaviour.’202 It is clear that the Claimant’s vegetarianism in Conis-
bee did not impact upon his daily life as much as the that of the Claimant’s vegan-
ism in Casamitjana Costa, therefore it is necessary to consider what differentiates a 
belief from a mere lifestyle choice.
It is not necessary for a philosophical belief to ‘govern the entirety of a person’s 
life’.203 Indeed, vegetarianism was suggested as an example of such a belief.204 
Again, it is difficult to reconcile the reasoning provided in each of the cases. The 
tribunal accepted in Casamitjana Costa the ‘relationship between humans and other 
fellow creatures is plainly a substantial aspect of human life’205 and therefore it 
should follow that someone who does not eat animal flesh due to their belief that it 
199 Id. para.45.
200 Conisbee v Crossley Farms Limited and others [2019] ET 3335357/2018 (England and Wales) 
para.16b.
201 Hashman v Milton Park (Dorset) Limited t/a Orchard Park [2011] ET 3105555/2009 (England and 
Wales).
202 Id. para.40.
203 Grainger plc and others v Nicholson [2010] I.C.R. 360, 371 (England and Wales).
204 Id.
205 Casamitjana Costa v The League Against Cruel Sports [2020] ET 3331129/2018 (England and 
Wales) para.35.
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is ‘wrong and immoral’ should also satisfy this aspect of the test as it is more than a 
mere lifestyle choice.
Cogency, Seriousness, Cohesion and Importance
In Conisbee, the tribunal rejected the notion that vegetarianism attained a certain 
level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance.206 The tribunal compared 
vegetarianism with veganism stating ‘the reason for being a vegetarian differs 
greatly…unlike veganism where the reasons for being a vegan appear to be largely 
the same.’207 The tribunal assert that there are many reasons to become vegetarian; 
lifestyle, health, diet, animal welfare and personal taste.208 However, the tribunal 
state that vegans do not accept the practice of eating animal flesh or products under 
any circumstances, due to a distinct concern about the way animals are reared and 
a ‘clear belief that killing and eating animals is contrary to a civilised society and 
also against climate control.’209 A similar statement was made in Casamitjana Costa 
acknowledging ethical veganism as attaining cogency, cohesion and importance 
describing ethical veganism as:
a way of life which seeks to exclude as far as possible and practical all forms 
of exploitation and cruelty to animals for food, clothing or any other purpose 
and by extension promotes the development and use of animal free alternatives 
for the benefit of humans, animals and the environment.210
In Conisbee, the tribunal were dismissive of the notion that vegetarianism achieved a 
similar status or cogency to that of religion. The judgment provides little in the way 
of reasoning, merely stating it was not enough to have a belief relating to an impor-
tant aspect of human life or behaviour.211 Interestingly, the tribunal in Casamitjana 
Costa did not expressly consider whether veganism attained a similar status or 
cogency to that of religion, albeit this finding could be implied from the discussion 
of veganism’s root in Ahimsa.212 Ahimsa was not discussed greatly in the judgment, 
but was highlighted that the concept of veganism is rooted in it, that it is the belief 
of causing no harm or injury, and that the Claimant followed these principles as a 
firm believer.
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The tribunal has misunderstood the concepts of vegetarianism and veganism, 
using the terminology generally where the concepts are, in reality, more nuanced. 
As discussed above, there are different classifications and subsets of vegetarians and 
vegans. Each classification or subset of veganism or vegetarianism should be con-
sidered to determine whether they satisfy the criteria for protection as a philosophi-
cal belief.
Whether veganism or vegetarianism are protected in the United States remains 
debateable. Schwartz outlines how ethical veganism as religious discrimination is 
not a new idea in the United States, but has ‘never fully made its way to the courts on 
its merits.’213 To the authors’ knowledge, the only decided cases on the matter have 
found against veganism being recognised as a religion. In 2002, Friedman v South-
ern California Permanente Medical Group,214 determined that veganism was not a 
‘religious creed’ within the meaning of meaning of the California Fair Employment 
and Housing Act. In 2006, a Californian Federal Court found that veganism was not 
a religion for the purpose of the First Amendment in relation to a prisoners request 
for a vegan diet.215 However, the EEOC has indicated that that they consider that a 
‘strict vegetarian’ does fall within the definition of religion for the purposes of Title 
VII.216 Further in 2012, the United States District Court Southern District Of Ohio 
Western Division found ‘it plausible that [the Plaintiff] could subscribe to veganism 
with a sincerity equating that of traditional religious views.’217 In both cases, the 
matter settled before a court determination and therefore, whilst these cases have not 
established that ethical veganism is a religion, they have also not finished the con-
versation of it in the courts.
The question of veganism and vegetarianism have not been tested before any 
Canadian court within the authors’ knowledge. In the 2012 case, Ketenci v Ryer-
son University,218 the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario did not find it necessary 
to consider whether ethical veganism fell within the definition of creed pursuant to 
the Ontario Human Rights Code.219 The tribunal determined that the applicant had 
no reasonable prospect of establishing that she was discriminated against because of 
her beliefs in ethical veganism.220
The Ontario Human Rights Commission did consider veganism within their con-
sultation on the definition of creed. Drawing upon the work of Labchuck and Szyt-
bel, it was suggested that confining the definition of creed to religion could result 
in the absurdity of differently sourced beliefs in ethical veganism being protected 
213 Rebecca Schwartz, Employers, Got Vegan: How Ethical Veganism Qualifies for Religious Protection 
under Title VII, 24 Animal L. 221, 230 (2018).
214 No. B150017. Second Dist., Div. Five. Sept. 13, 2002.
215 McDavid v County of Sacramento ED Cal., June 27, 2006.
216 Anderson v Orange County Transit Authority, Charge No. 345960598, EEOC Determination Letter.
217 Chenzira v Cincinnati Childrens’ Hospital, No. 1:2011cv00917 - Document 18 (S.D. Ohio 2012).
218 2012 HRTO 994 (Ontario, Canada).
219 Id. para.2.
220 Id.
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differently.221 Labchuck provided the example of: (1) a Jain follower, who is vegan 
for religious reasons; (2) a practising Christian who sees veganism as a religious 
duty: (3) A Christian who is vegan, but is a vegan for secular moral relating to ani-
mal welfare; and (4) An atheist who is an ethical vegan for strictly secular moral rea-
sons.222 Labchuck argued that excluding secular beliefs from the definition of creed 
would result in the ‘apparent logical absurdity’ that protection would only apply to 
the first two examples despite all being equally committed to the same ethical vegan 
beliefs.223
As a consequence of the above consultation, the ‘Policy on preventing discrimi-
nation based on creed’224 was updated to explicitly state creed included non-reli-
gious beliefs. Based upon the consultation, there is clearly an argument that creed 
includes ethical veganism.
It appears the definition of creed will be tested before the Human Rights Tribunal 
of Ontario to determine whether it includes ‘ethical veganism’ in the case of Knauff 
v Ministry of Natural Resources. This case concerns a firefighter, with a belief in 
ethical veganism, alleging a chronic lack of vegan food and cross-contamination in 
the preparation of the food.225 The Casamitjana Costa case is likely to be cited per-
suasively with Mr Knauff’s lawyer, Wade Poziomka, quoted as saying:
[It] demonstrates to the HRTO that ethical veganism as a creed is not neces-
sarily something novel. Ontario is not being asked to lead the way in respect 
of this issue—we’re simply asking the Tribunal to apply the facts of Adam’s 
particular case and his particular belief-system to the already-accepted creed 
standard in Ontario. This case shows it is already happening elsewhere.226
The development of the law around philosophical beliefs or creeds demonstrate 
that ethical veganism can be protected pursuant to anti-discrimination legislation. 
Indeed, Mr Knauff is hoping the ruling in his case ‘could be influential in other 
221 Labchuck, C., Protecting secular beliefs: Should creed provisions protect ethical vegans from dis-
crimination?, Paper presented at the Ontario Human Rights Commission/York University Legal Work-
shop on Human rights, creed and freedom of religion (2012, March 29–30) Osgoode Hall, York Uni-
versity. Retrieved from https ://docs.googl e.com/file/d/0BwFv hg37T TCjMk 84Q0l 4QTdi c3M/previ ew; 
Sztybel, D., Giving credence to philosophical creeds: The cases of Buddhism and veganism. Paper pre-
sented at the Ontario Human Rights Commission/York University Legal Workshop on Human rights, 
creed and freedom of religion (2012, March 29–30) Osgoode Hall, York University Retrieved from https 
://docs.googl e.com/file/d/0BwFv hg37T TCjS1 Awa1J SNkJZ NWM/previ ew?pli=1 as cited in Ontario 
Human Rights Commission, Human Rights and Creed: Research and consultation report, 49 (2013).
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224 Ontario Human Rights Commission, Policy on preventing discrimination based on creed, (17 Sep-
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provinces and internationally.’227 The legal profession within Canada also acknowl-
edge the development in this area with one lawyer commenting:
Times are changing. While the development of creed as a protected ground 
is in its infancy, we fully expect that this will become an important aspect of 
human rights protections in British Columbia in the near future.228
Should Veganism and Vegetarianism be a Philosophical Belief?
This article has so far outlined the law relating to discrimination and protected 
philosophical beliefs, and the different kinds of veganism and vegetarianism, and 
their influencing factors. The following section analyses and discusses whether they 
should in fact be protected philosophical beliefs and, if so, to what extent.
The authors concur with the decision in Casamitjana Costa to the extent that 
ethical veganism should be protected as a philosophical belief. Further, the authors 
argue that ethical vegetarianism should also be considered a philosophical belief. 
What becomes more difficult is where we draw the line with what kinds of vegans 
and vegetarians benefit from the above law. Schwartz argues that this is depend-
ent on how the ethical vegan/vegetarian lives their life, and how they present their 
arguments.229 Though the practice of veganism may be similar between the different 
groups outlined above, it is the underlying belief of the practice which is philosophi-
cal, or religious as some argue, in nature.230 This is a difficulty Schwartz outlines, 
for example, what position does a court take for a health vegan turned ethical vegan? 
We know from the studies discussed above that some of those who began as a vegan 
other than ethical, have since done research and moved over to the ethical branch. 
Would this restrict their claim of it being a protected philosophical belief, or even 
religion? The authors argue not, as the reason for starting the practice is irrelevant 
to the beliefs held at the time of the discrimination, and the seriousness with which 
they are held. It will be based on the individual and how they practice and hold that 
belief, as long as they maintain that it is a philosophy, which influences how they 
live their life and the choices they make. It is useful at this point to make an anal-
ogy with religion. It is clear that an individual who has found, or converted to reli-
gion, whatever that religion may be, would be protected from discrimination on the 
grounds of that religion.
Whilst the case for ethical veganism appears to be well established, should 
other types of veganism warrant protection as a philosophical belief? The case of 
227 Lily Puckett, ‘Vegan firefighter complains to Human Rights Tribunal because he wasn’t offered 
enough food’food, Independent (22 May 2019) https ://www.indep enden t.co.uk/news/world /ameri cas/
vegan -firefi ghte r-sue-food-ontar io-human -right s-a8926 246.html.
228 Richard Johnson, ‘Creed: Protecting Veganism as a Human Right’ Right (11 March 2020) https ://
kente mploy mentl aw.com/2020/creed -prote cting -vegan ism-as-a-human -right /.
229 Rebecca Schwartz, Employers, Got Vegan: How Ethical Veganism Qualifies for Religious Protection 
under Title VII, 24 Animal L. 221 (2018).
230 Lisa Johnson, The Religion of Ethical Veganism, 5(1) Journal of Animal Ethics 31 (2015).
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Casamitjana Costa highlights how the Claimant lived in a way which held the belief 
of ethical veganism, linked to a philosophical belief that we should not harm ani-
mals, closely linked to Ahimsa philosophy. He refused to consume any food which 
he believed had harmed animals, but beyond this, he would not live with compan-
ion animals, and would avoid travelling on public transport which could potentially 
harm insects or birds. It is clear that his ethical veganism was a belief which was 
found to have cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance. The authors argue 
that this should be the same principles are applicable for environmental vegans, 
with support from Grainger plc and others v Nicholson,231 which held that climate 
change is a protected philosophical belief. Health vegans, on the other hand, practis-
ing veganism solely for intrinsic reasons and to benefit their own health, should not 
be protected under law.
The authors posit that health vegans would not satisfy the criteria for establish-
ing a philosophical belief. Firstly, it is an opinion and viewpoint that a vegan diet 
is healthier than a non-vegan diet. By definition, if an individual is adopting a diet 
for health reasons, if there was evidence to suggest an alternative non-vegan diet 
was healthier, it is likely their opinion and viewpoint would change. At the very 
least, they would consider the alternative. Secondly, the authors suggest that health 
veganism is a lifestyle choice that cannot be described as relating to a weighty and 
substantial aspect of human life and behaviour. Finally, health veganism is entirely 
intrinsic and therefore, in the authors’ view, lacks the necessary level of cogency, 
seriousness, cohesion and importance. If health veganism were considered a phil-
osophical belief, then the belief in attending the gym might also be considered a 
philosophical belief. For the same reasons, the authors suggest that health veganism 
does not have a similar status or cogency to a religious belief.
The issue with Casamitjana Costa being the first case to state ethical vegan-
ism as a protected philosophical belief, is just how extremely the Claimant follows 
the practices and the extents he goes to, to ensure that he is not participating in the 
harm of animals. For future cases, it is not sure how strict a vegan has to be, or how 
much impact they let it have on, or influence in, their life. In Conisbee, for exam-
ple, though the Claimant held a belief that it was wrong to kill and eat other ani-
mals, it was not found strong enough to be held as a philosophical belief, but rather 
an opinion or a view point. The authors believe the Employment Tribunal adopted 
a simplistic definition of vegetarianism and, as discussed in this article, there are 
many different branches of vegans and vegetarians with different influencing factors. 
It has already been argued that ‘at best Conisbee could be described as a muddled 
judgment; at worst, it is seriously flawed.232 Many vegetarians would strongly disa-
gree that their belief is a lifestyle choice and not a philosophical belief. Further, as 
highlighted above, studies have shown that a number of vegans become vegetarian 
first before making the transition, so to deny that they have that philosophical belief 
231 Grainger plc and others v Nicholson [2010] I.C.R. 360, 371 (England and Wales).
232 Frank Cranmer, A Critique of the Decision in Conisbee that Vegetarianism in not ‘A Belief’, 22(1) 
Ecclesiastical Law Journal 36, 48 (2020).
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whilst going on that journey is an incorrect and narrow view. As Edge stressed, the 
view of ethical vegetarianism that killing and eating animals is morally wrong, is 
wider than the decision in Hashman v Milton Park (Dorset) Ltd, that animals should 
not be hunted for sport.233 There needs to be a middle ground, and ethical vegetari-
anism, or even environmental vegetarianism, should fall on the side of protection. 
We can again draw an analogy with religion and consider the comparison between 
devout and non-devout followers of a religion. Whilst their practice, or the mani-
festation of the religion, may be different, the underlying belief is the same. If we 
consider the application of this in Conisbee and Casamitjana Costa, whilst the man-
ifestation of their belief was significantly different, they both believed it was morally 
wrong to kill animals.
The authors suggest that it is misconceived to determine whether an individual 
has a philosophical belief based upon the label of being a vegan or a vegetarian. 
Whilst many vegans are likely to satisfy the criteria to qualify as a philosophical 
belief, some vegans may not. Similarly, some vegetarians may satisfy the criteria 
whilst others will not. In essence, the court or tribunal need to consider the underly-
ing rationale as to why an individual practices veganism or vegetarianism to deter-
mine whether it is a philosophical belief, not merely looking at the manifestation of 
their veganism or vegetarianism. The classifications and subsets of veganism and 
vegetarianism may assist in this determination but ultimately, each belief is personal.
Whilst we can criticise the approach adopted by the tribunal, Casamitjana Costa 
demonstrates that ethical veganism has been judicially recognised as a philosophical 
belief, building upon the jurisprudence of the EHCR. Casamitjana Costa provides 
persuasive authority that ethical veganism should be a protected belief not only in 
other cases within England and Wales, but also in other jurisdictions. There is a 
distinct challenge in veganism and vegetarianism being recognised as a religion, as 
illustrated in the United States. However, where non-secular beliefs are protected 
independently of religious beliefs, there is a stronger argument for inclusion. The 
wording of legislation protecting non-secular beliefs may take different forms; 
‘thought and conscience’; ‘philosophical beliefs’; or ‘creed’. After all, the language 
used is synonymous.
However, the mere recognition of ethical veganism as a protected belief does not 
necessarily mean significant changes in the protection afforded. The extent of pro-
tection varies across jurisdictions in the areas subject to protection on the grounds 
of religion and belief, as well as the types of discrimination afforded protection. The 
authors have identified the broad range of discrimination experienced by vegans and 
vegetarians, often as a consequence of the manifestation of their beliefs. There will 
therefore be a continuing question as to how far it is reasonable to protect or accom-
modate those beliefs.
233 Peter Edge, Vegetarianism as a protected characteristic: Another view on Conisbee, Law and Reli-
gion UK (23 September 2019) https ://www.lawan dreli gionu k.com/2019/09/23/veget arian ism-as-a-prote 
cted-chara cteri stic-anoth er-view-on-conis bee/.
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Conclusion
What has become clear throughout this article is that there is no clear definition 
of a vegan or a vegetarian, and what influences the choice to abstain from meat, 
and possibly other animal derived products, is not necessarily based on one factor. 
There are potentially multiple reasons as to why an individual chooses to practice 
veganism or vegetarianism, which can change and evolve over time. What this 
does mean, however, is that it can impact on whether it is perceived to be a pro-
tected philosophical belief, worthy of protection of the law.
In Casamitjana Costa it was clear that the Claimant has a deeply rooted philo-
sophical belief in his veganism, to the extent that it impacted on almost every 
aspect of his life. What is concerning, though, is how this extremity will affect 
future claims and the extent a claim will have to go to, in order to justify their 
veganism or vegetarianism as a philosophical belief. This is exactly the issues 
faced in the previous case of Conisbee, where his vegetarianism was deemed to 
be a lifestyle choice, rather than appreciating that it also ‘expresses the convic-
tion that to be fully human is to have reverence for all life, especially sentient life. 
This includes a rejection of violence.’234
Whilst the judgment in Casamitjana Costa is a First Instance decision, and 
therefore not binding, it is important. It has sent a message that the philosophi-
cal belief in ethical veganism, which has been justified through research and 
academic writings, is recognised, and can be protected from discrimination. The 
comparison to religion is not one the authors think is a substantial argument, 
and it is important to recognise and protect beliefs which are secular, and more 
aligned to philosophical beliefs or creeds. Rather than try to fit veganism and 
vegetarianism into the narrow definition of religion, or even argue for the estab-
lishment of a Church of Animal Liberation,235 those who hold this belief can still 
be adequately protected and realised by law.
Veganism and vegetarianism are genuine philosophical beliefs which, to the 
individuals who believe and practice it, is important and impacts greatly on their 
everyday life. This belief is strong, but not only for ethical vegans, it is also pre-
sent in ethical and environmental vegans and vegetarians. The criteria and prac-
tices for establishing this belief should not be held to the high standard provided 
in Casamitjana Costa, and extended to others who hold the belief, though they 
may not practice it as extremely as what has been established in law. The belief 
that is held philosophically needs to be established in law, so that those who prac-
tice it can be protected from discrimination in law.
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